Analysis 8 min read

Global War IV: Pacific War

Syria was not Iraq, and the intervention was not short-lived like in Iraq. It lasted until Assad left the country in the winter of 2024 – exactly 13 years, 8 months and 22 days. The fate of Syria’s war was changed by Iran and Russia.

Will they remain silent in the face of Iran’s own fate?

Saddam-led Iraq was not an Iranian proxy force. When Iran was told of a planned intervention in Iraq by PDK leader Mesûd Barzani, they responded by saying “don’t believe it” – so convinced were they that the process would benefit them in the long run.

The plan was to intervene in Iraq, then open up an anti-imperialist struggle in which Iraq would fall under the Shia axis under that banner. Thousands of live suicide bombers detonated in mosques and markets served this purpose.

Syria, on the other hand, was an Iranian proxy. While Russia, the superpower behind Syria, was busy with the occupation of Crimea until 2014, Iran was on the ground to prevent the Assad regime from falling. When it became clear that Iran was controlling the process, Russia began to get seriously involved on the ground in 2015.

Did the Iranian intervention that we have been trying to predict for years even come to fruition in a similar way? Did Russia stay away because they are already exhausted in Ukraine? Did China say “I can’t even defend Taiwan, what can I do for Iran!”?

Who will shape the next hundred years is not determined by the goals and ambitions of the parties, but by what they do, when, how and where. Not why!

Russia, China, North Korea, and even Turkey may not have stopped supporting Iran yesterday, but tomorrow’s opportunities for various actors are there too. China does not need to shoot down American planes over Iran or the Persian Gulf to support Iran. Instead, it can choose to challenge the United States in Taiwan while the American side has depleted its stockpiles and entered an unplanned, protracted phase after more than three months of war planning.

Russia could make an unexpected move that breaks the pattern before China. This risk and probability was already clear several months before the Ukraine war, and that was one of the reasons why AUKUS was formed on September 15, 2021 – precisely to strengthen the defense of Taiwan, knowing that NATO could prove inadequate or even blocked due to members like Turkey. Already that year, procurements for warships, submarines and other resources were announced solely for this purpose.

While the entire Eastern Bloc is pinning its hopes on China, for China it is not just about accumulating power, but just as much about not missing the strategic window.

When Russia entered the Ukraine war, it must have expected that Ukraine would not be left alone, and it probably planned to share the burden with other allies where needed. The idea may have been that a process that simultaneously pressures the West on several fronts is more advantageous. Against the West's strategy of buying time and preventing the spread of the war is the East's strategy of compressing time. Therefore, the Pacific War will be determined not only by where and how it is fought, but at least as much by when it breaks out. In the political and military coordination of the Eastern Bloc, Russia's role has become clear. Under Putin's leadership, this axis is taking shape, complemented by China's economic and technological rise.

Iran, North Korea, Turkey and Pakistan appear as peripherally supporting actors in this broad geopolitical space, while Hungary and Slovakia in Europe constitute fragile links that have contact with the axis.

The intervention in Venezuela was, like the formation of AUKUS, a preparation. Pulling a country with the world's largest oil reserves away from the influence of the Eastern Bloc is about being able to control oil use and oil prices in the great coming war. The US is still the center of the global system and must confront the Eastern Bloc led by Russia. US power rests on three pillars: the financial system (dominance of the dollar), technological infrastructure and military alliance networks.

In the global struggle for hegemony, the EU, the UK and Israel are not just regional actors but critical multipliers that reinforce the strategic capacity of the Western bloc. The EU represents the institutional backbone of the Western system through its economic weight, financial order and normative power, while developing a new security reflex against the Russian threat. Israel contributes technology, intelligence and military capabilities in the Middle East that extend far beyond the region and play a strategic role in the US global architecture. Within this structure, the Western bloc under US leadership is not just an alliance system but a multi-layered global power network where finance, technology, intelligence and military power are integrated. Therefore, in a possible Pacific conflict, the Western bloc has the capacity to create simultaneous strategic pressure not only via the Asia-Pacific region but also via Europe and the Middle East.

Here the India factor becomes critical. A geopolitical line is being formed against China in which India increasingly acts as a counterweight in harmony with the West. Border conflicts, competition in the Indian Ocean and the Pacific, and economic repositioning make India an indirect but decisive player in the Pacific equation. A possible Chinese offensive would not only be about Taiwan but would create a multi-layered rift that would reshape the balance of power in Asia as a whole.

In this grand strategic chess game, timing has become the decisive factor. The assessment that the Pacific War could break out in May–June is not incorrect. For an amphibious operation, weather, waves and visibility conditions are strategically critical. It is a period when both military preparations are complete and the political windows are most open – a critical threshold.

A war that breaks out in the Pacific region will not stop at a regional conflict between two powers. Such an incident would trigger a process in which long-accumulated geopolitical tensions simultaneously come to the surface. Therefore, the Pacific War should be seen not as a single front but as the starting point of a multi-faceted global dynamic of chaos.

 

If these lines are activated simultaneously, the result will not be a classic world war, but a multi-layered global conflict with significantly more far-reaching effects. If the crisis in the Pacific deepens, it is very likely that Moscow will react by once again setting the Eastern European front in motion. The European front is one of the most effective ways to divide the West's attention and resources. At the same time, it would sharpen the security reflex within NATO and accelerate the remilitarization of Europe.

Iran has long emerged as the “Queen Bee” of the Eastern Bloc in this equation. Does Putin, who constantly talks about a new world order, really have a place for Iran – or does he see fit to sacrifice Iran as firewood and instead hand over its roles to Turkey? The movements will clarify the decision. It is likely that Iran will be pushed out of the equation and that Turkey will take a more active role on behalf of the Eastern Bloc. The intensive technology transfer to Turkey should be seen in this light. Turkey’s historical and strategic lines of tension with actors such as Israel and Greece could develop into a broader conflict. What really drives this front are not the individual actors but the nature of the power vacuum. When the balance in the Middle East is upset, the conflicts can quickly become multi-actor and uncontrollable – that is the most unpredictable dimension of a global war. 

The Ukraine war has served the parties’ strategy of wearing each other down, while the Pacific war will serve a systemic war. The Iran intervention in the middle is then the West's attempt to create a balance between these two wars. 

This image pushes the Eastern Bloc towards a single center: China is today not only an economic power but the bearer of the only systemic alternative that the East can offer to the West.

China is rising, but dependent. It is growing, but fragile. It faces a historic decision: to rise by integrating into the system, or to challenge the system to rebuild it. In making this decision, it has its eye on the opportunities that Russia and Iran are creating.